Title: The Bodily Conception of Pain
Time: 11.00 – 13.00
Date: Monday 14th November
Location: Humss 301
ABSTRACT: The standard view in philosophy treats pains as mental states with a particular type of phenomenal character. This view has a number of corollaries, including that it locates pains in the mind, rules out the possibility of pain hallucinations, and denies that there can be unfelt pains. The main argument put forward in support of the standard view is that it supposedly corresponds with the ordinary or commonsense conception of pain. Despite this, empirical evidence is mounting that non-philosophers do not tend to conceptualize pains in this way; rather, they tend to treat pains as being bodily states. In this talk I will survey the current evidence, including cross-cultural research suggesting that the bodily conception of pains is not specific to English speakers.
SPEAKER: Justin Systma is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. He is a leading experimental philosopher with particular focuses on pain, consciousness, and language. To read more about him and his publications visit his website.
Continuing our series of pain events, we will have three visiting speakers next term (titles/rooms to follow):
4th October, 2-3.30pm
Prof. Jaideep Pandit
St. John’s Oxford and Consultant Anaesthetist at the Oxford University Hospitals
25th October, 2-3.30pm
Dr. Jennifer Corns
Philosophy, University of Glasgow
6th December, 2-3.30pm
Professor Michael Brady
Philosophy, University of
Dr Miguel Sebastián (UNAM Philosophy) and Dr James Stazicker (Reading Philosophy) will present some joint work in progress at CCR on Tuesday 14th June (2.00-3.30pm in HumSS 73). Miguel is visiting Reading as part of his British Academy Newton Mobility Fund project working with James on perceptual discrimination:
The talk will draw on predictions of Signal Detection Theory to criticise some philosophical theories of consciousness, as well as making some more positive proposals about what consciousness really is.
There will be a pain seminar next week but please note that (contra to the previous timetable) it will happen in the afternoon, not the morning. So details are:
Topic: Pain in different disciplines
Speakers: Alison Black (Typography), Hannah Newton (History)
Date: Wednesday 25th May
Location: CiNN seminar room
All welcome and apologies for changing the time of the seminar, hope this doesn’t inconvenience anyone too much.
We will be running the CCR Summer Seminar Series again this year – on the topic of ‘Understanding Pain’. The schedule is still under construction, and thus may be subject to change, but currently it’s as follows:
|27th April||The psychology of pain||Tim Salomons & Daniel Jordan (Psych)|
|4th May||Philosophical views of pain||Jumbly Grindrod (Phil)|
|11th May||The language of pain||Nat Hansen and Emma Borg (Philosophy)|
|1st June||Pain in the hospital setting||Deepak Ravindran (Royal Berkshire Hospital) & Richard Harrison|
|8th June||Summary event / social (?)|
There will also be an additional summer CCR talk on Tuesday 14th June, details to follow.
Emma Borg (Reading)
Title: What is the basis of social cognition? On behaviour-reading, mirroring and mindreading.
When: 2pm, Tuesday 8th March
Where: URS 2s14 (Urban and Regional Studies Building)
A common deflationary tendency has emerged recently in both philosophical accounts and comparative animal studies concerned with social cognition. The suggestion in both arenas is that the default mechanism for social cognition is a form of ‘smart behaviour-reading’ which does not require consideration of the mental states of a target. Instead humans and other animals are held to explain or predict the behaviour of conspecifics exclusively or largely through sensitivity to the observable, behavioural (non-mental) features of a situation. This paper examines the plausibility of this deflationary move and argues that, at least in the human case, it is a mistake to take the default method of social cognition to be smart behaviour-reading. Instead we should adopt a genuinely pluralist view on which both behaviour-reading and genuine mindreading have a critical role to play. I conclude by considering how the proposed view relates to discussions about two-system models and the ontology of social cognition.