EUref: What are the facts?

Both official(ish) sides of the EU referendum campaign are under fire for supposedly misleading voters by presenting opinions as facts. Vote Leave produced an official-looking “facts” leaflet that hid their campaign name into small font on the back page, while the government has spent £9m producing a leaflet setting out its position.

The common thing whenever “facts” are referred to is that one side considers them facts, and the other propaganda. Propaganda is defined as “information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view” – it’s information used to influence others, and naturally both sides assert the other side is misleading people into voting against their cause.

Is there then any real hope for clarity in this debate? I think there is, if we try and boil down to particular dimensions of the question. We won’t necessarily get numbers, but we’ll get directions of effects, certainly if we’re thinking in the economic sphere.

For example (and in a private correspondence with Leave.EU they have conceded this point), at the moment firms can employ people (relatively) freely from all over the EU, rather than just from within the UK. Try to employ someone from outside the EU and that likely involves a costly interview process to determine suitability of match, and then another costly process of getting a visa, a process to be repeated every time the visa expires.

It stands to reason then that given firms can employ people from a much larger pool of potential workers, they will be able to find a better match as an employee than if restricted to just UK workers (and of course, if they could employ anyone from anywhere in the world, then they’d likely find a better match still, but that option isn’t on the cards at the moment, if ever). Hence British firms, and indeed firms elsewhere in the EU that have hired workers from another EU country, have done so on the basis that that non-native is the best possible person for the job – and equally, that person has figured that company is the best company for them to be working for.

If we then apply non-EU rules to EU workers, this has to have some impact. It means it becomes more costly to appoint the best person for the job if that person is from another EU country, reducing the likelihood that that person is appointed. That then reduces output from that firm as the firm must be less efficient as a result. Even if they still hire that EU worker, the HR costs of appointing that person, renewing their visa and associated bureaucratic costs and uncertainty, that is still time and effort that could have gone to productive purposes within the firm.

Since there are over 2m such EU workers in the UK, and a similar number of UK workers elsewhere in the EU, that is a lot of people immediately affected by such changes. That likely is a much greater number when families are taken into account. They may well stay, and indeed many of the EU workers here in the UK that I know well are taking steps to ensure they can stay (applying for British citizenship, at significant costs to themselves and indirectly to their workplaces). The point though is that these are actions that otherwise would not have been taken.

In addition, what is the effect on hiring decisions in the coming years, in the event of Brexit? Will EU workers better suited to UK jobs than any British worker be suitably discouraged from applying? Will EU workers in the UK be discouraged from changing jobs to a better suited role by the increased bureaucracy involved in any such step?

All in all, these are not numbers, which we commonly associate with “facts”, but they are directions. The impacts described here cannot be positive on productivity in the UK, nor on stress levels, nor on levels of red tape and bureaucracy. Hence the only real question is whether they are a price worth paying for some greater benefit from leaving?

WhatsApp and Encryption

Encryption is in the news; last night you may have noticed WhatsApp inform you that your messages are now “end-to-end encrypted”, and it’s hard not to link this to other events such as repeated attempts by the FBI to get Apple to let them inside its products.

The issue is one of privacy – should your messages to others on your phone be subject to warrants by governments and law enforcement agencies to access them? By adding this level of encryption, WhatsApp cannot see the messages we send, and hence cannot comply with any such warrant. No “wire tap” can be put on your WhatsApp messages, and nobody can “overhear” them, or “eavesdrop” on them any more.

For many people, that’s a great thing – nobody wants others muscling in on private correspondence. Equally, of course, it comes at the same time as another vast tranche of private correspondences regarding tax avoidance and offshore tax havens, were made publicly available in the Panama Papers. Which illustrates the tension: having privacy is great provided we are all nice and law abiding citizens doing nothing wrong. The moment we start doing things that are wrong, then our private correspondences are where we will discuss that wrongdoing.

And of course, on a much more sinister level, it is alleged that terrorists use apps like WhatsApp to communicate in order to avoid the attentions of law enforcement, and hence the desire of the FBI to get hold of the iPhone of a US terrorist. Hence should we afford terrorists more protection by allowing WhatsApp to encrypt like this, or should we, as the UK government has spoken of doing (although not in light of the Panama papers, it might be noted), in the interests of national security?

What could economics shed on to this? One insight economics often affords is that there is an optimal level of everything. We might assert the optimal level of illegal activity is zero, but when there is a private benefit to engaging in illegal activity, and a cost to law enforcement, then there must be a trade off such that the optimal level is not zero. It would take a practically infinite amount of resources to stamp out every kind of illegal activity and as such is impractical. Hence we cannot expect to stamp out terrorism completely, and we must accept that it will always exist. If end-to-end encrypted messaging services exist, they will be used by those engaging in illegal activity. But by and large there will be other ways in which to catch such people in the act of carrying out illegal activities such that impinging on the civil liberties of the masses need not be a necessary cost of making the job of law enforcement much easier.

Equally, a little reasoning from statistical or econometric thinking might help here, too. With any decision in econometrics, there is the risk of a Type I or Type II Error. These are false positives, and false negatives, respectively: incorrectly rejecting something that is true, and incorrectly not rejecting something that is false. With easier ability to eavesdrop on people, will law enforcement agencies use this to pursue the wrong people, people who are simply going about their day-to-day activities without engaging in any kind of terrorist activities? Of course greater surveillance means that catching terrorists will be easier, but will it mean that innocent people are caught up in the machinery set up to catch terrorists?

Avoiding Tax and Panama

The big story at the moment surrounds Panama, which many folk may know best from Prison Break rather than its financial sector. A truly massive leak of confidential files from a law firm (terabytes, not just gigabytes…) is causing embarrassment and more for many leading global figures. UK Prime Minister David Cameron is fending off questions about his family’s involvement with the law firm via his father, while the Icelandic Prime Minister was more deeply embroiled and has already bitten the bullet. Links to Vladimir Putin do not appear to have caused quite so much shock and consternation

What exactly is going on, and why does it matter from a macroeconomic perspective? It must matter, since it pertains to billions of dollars. Economies have billions of dollars (or pounds, or euros) moving around within them, and hence that billions ended up in Panama rather than the places that the people mentioned above are located is of interest.

Towards the end of term we covered the Balance of Payments, which is the financial account of a country – what financial flows go in and out of a country. Clearly, it seems, considerable flows went out of the UK, Iceland, and Russia to Panama, and for what? Money is moved from one place to another usually for some purpose – for example an investment, or to pay for imported goods. The claim, however, is that much of these financial flows were “offshore” – moving of money primarily for the purpose of avoiding paying taxes.

In the case of Ian Cameron, the PM’s dad, their company Blairmore Holdings was based in Panama, it would seem, to avoid paying as much tax as would be paid in the UK. However, as the leaks appear to make clear, major decisions about the firm were still made in the UK (based on documented meetings of board members revealed in the leaks) – which apparently is the test of where a company is “located”. What this makes clear is the difficulty of regulation – definitions have to be made for things that are easy to think about, but harder to pin down the detail of – what is the definition of where a company is located? And once a definition is made in a country’s law, it will provoke those in that country to consider ways in which that law can be avoided. As a result, it’s likely that those involved will claim nothing illegal was done, regardless of the wider moral implications about doing right and wrong.

Economic activity, you’ll learn more as you study further in microeconomic topics, tends to need some level of regulation. However, that regulation need not be a panacea, and need not lead to unintended consequences. The rise of offshore tax havens came primarily in response to higher tax rates in major Western economies, particularly in the 1970s, and of course regulation is something that many in favour of the UK leaving the EU cite as a reason to leave. A very thoughtful friend of mine has noted the link between these two – the UK remains a place for lots of finance taking place onshore, and is so at least in part because of its position within the single market (single market = more customers = more revenues). If that attraction was lost, the UK may need to consider other ways to retain its position, which may include more favourable tax and regulatory arrangements for finance – yet financial markets are precisely the markets where the clamour for “more regulation” has been greatest since the financial crisis.

As with anything in macroeconomics, it’s complicated, but it’s well worth studying!

The Losers from Free Trade (and Donald Trump)

Thomas Frank writes in the Guardian that when Donald Trump “isn’t spewing insults, the Republican frontrunner is hammering home a powerful message about free trade and its victims”.

It’s a challenging point about a central aspect of what Frank calls “Econ 101”, but we understand as EC114, Introductory Macroeconomics: comparative advantage. The idea that all countries specialise in the things they are comparatively better at (rather than absolutely better at), and as a result we all do better. So Mexico produces air conditioning units, while America produces the designs for awesome Apple computers (made in China).

However, what does that mean for those who used to produce air conditioning units in America? Or those here in the UK who used to build ships?

As we pointed out in the lecture, free trade doesn’t mean all benefit. However, free trade does envisage that those displaced from industries that a country is not specialising in are able to move into those industries that a country is specialising in. So why hasn’t that happened in so many parts of the UK, and the US? Undoubtedly the article written by Frank could be applied here in the UK to the rhetoric of Nigel Farage and Ukip.

It’s tempting to say that we’ll find an answer at some point in the rest of the course, yet the reality is that depressed parts of the UK have been depressed for decades now, and things never seem to change – which suggests that the problem hasn’t really been solved as yet… or has it?

Frank concludes with a tirade against free trade but more: “Ill-considered trade deals and generous bank bailouts and guaranteed profits for insurance companies but no recovery for average people, ever – these policies have taken their toll.” To what extent have bank bailouts left us with a banking system unwilling to extend credit to firms willing to move into depressed areas of the country and create jobs?

Even if that’s true, however, most depressed areas of the UK have been depressed for longer than just the time since the Financial Crisis…

Brexit Referendum: So it all begins!

As was fully expected, the UK In/Out referendum will happen on June 23. Which way will you vote?

If the 48 hours or so since this was announced is anything to go by, it promises to absolutely dominate all news headlines between now and then. So expect to be thoroughly bored by it all by the time June comes around.

However, please as students of the economy, don’t get bored and switch off until you’ve worked out what the right decision is on June 23. This is a huge decision for the UK economy, as hopefully what we’ve learnt in Intro Macro has taught you already.

Everything we’ve learnt about has had implications and applications in the EU debate.

We started with economic growth, and the kinds of conditions that would foster higher trend economic growth, looking at the supply side of the economy, and Total Factor Productivity. This is the most fundamental question we have to ponder: what impact does EU membership have on our trend growth rate? At the moment, most commentators are focussed on relative positions in the business cycle (UK better, EU not so good). But (1) the work of Robert Lucas was cited in our lectures to point out that trend growth is hugely more important than business cycle fluctuations, and (b) it’s been far from always this way, and indeed for much of the post-war economic history, European growth has been stronger than UK growth. Is that a reason for thinking about staying then? I’d argue probably not, I’d suggest you should think about why it might be that trend growth might increase or decrease.

We covered unemployment after that. Isn’t unemployment higher because of free movement of labour, meaning that cheap labour from Eastern Europe can come over and take all “our jobs”? This argument covers over a lot of important detail. Firstly, there isn’t some fixed supply of jobs, which we alluded to by thinking about shifts in labour demand curves. Hence it may be that by having Eastern European migrants here, more is produced in the UK economy, and hence more jobs become available.

Which jobs are being taken? By and large, it’s lower skilled (or unskilled) jobs. And the problem with these kinds of jobs is that they are equally the first to go in economic downturns, and are the easier jobs to be replaced by computers and automation. Hence unskilled labour is under threat from immigration, but equally it’s under threat from the machines.

We can carry on going through the course so far, and I’ll be trying in lecture to relate things we cover to the EU Brexit debate, since it matters hugely. At the outset I’ll make it clear: I think, having thought a lot about the issues, and looked at the arguments in favour of leaving in particular, that the UK is much better off inside the EU. That doesn’t mean some killer argument for leaving isn’t lurking around the corner, and I’ll encourage you to find that killer argument – it’s very important you, and we as a class, have considered all possible arguments, and been rigorous about them, before deciding which way to vote.

What’s wrong with populist policies?

Last year Jeremy Corbyn overwhelmingly won the Labour Party’s leadership contest here in the UK, on what is widely regarded as a “populist” platform – a range of policies that are popular amongst those on the left of the political spectrum. These include the renationalisation of utilities and other industries like the railways, and a more pacifistic approach to national defence. Corbyn also had the advantage of not being the “establishment” candidate, the one tainted with previous government, and the one perceived to be a “typical politician”.

This year the next President of the United States of America will be determined in a November election, and as current incumbent Barack Obama has served his two terms, both Democrats and Republicans are currently determining who will be their nominated candidate for the November election.

Last night, both of the non-establishment candidates won handsome victories in New Hampshire, one of the many contests around the US that contribute towards determine who is nominated by each party. For the Democrats, Bernie Sanders won apparently by a 20 percentage point margin – a huge win. For the Republicans, the controversial Donald Trump won, again by a large margin.

What does this mean? The common thinking is that as both candidates are more populist, and appealing to non-standard political audiences (Sanders, aged 74, is massively popular amongst younger voters, something that happened for Corbyn here), that the likelihood is of more populist policies in the future.

What are populist policies? Very simply, they are ideas that are popular amongst a substantial proportion of the population. As such, can this really be a bad thing? Populist policies are often disparaged by mainstream, or “establishment” politicians, because although they may be popular, they are probably quite unrealistic in their nature. Those “tainted” by government likely know the kinds of compromises that need to be made in order for policies to be practical and workable, and the kinds of interest groups and power factions that impact eventual policy outcomes in the political decision-making.

Perhaps as a result such “establishment” politicians tend towards promoting what they view as more work-able policies, which are less popular due to appearing watered down. This maybe explains why many people felt at the last General Election here in the UK that there wasn’t very much between the two major parties.

Hence if populism simply means some candidates proposing popular policies, with others arguing against them, this can hardly, in itself, be a bad thing? Debate about policies is surely important, as is a wider engagement in the political process, since the outcomes of elections do matter so much to many of us. Jeremy Corbyn has ploughed a lonely furrow in recent months arguing in favour of refugees displaced around the Middle East and Europe, even visiting the camps in Calais and Dunkirk – and being mocked in the press and by other politicians, including the Prime Minister, for doing so.

There is an additional element, however. Even if Trump and Sanders become the party candidates in November, only one will win, and even if they win, there is the likelihood they could not enact all the populist policies they wish because of the role Congress plays in decisionmaking in the US – current president Obama has repeatedly be blocked in attempts to take action by a Congress dominated by Republicans. The Labour Party in the UK is widely expected to perform miserably at the next General Election, meaning that for all the time spent developing interesting policy debate, there may really be little actual impact on policies, which will be conceived by and put into place by Labour’s opponents, the Conservative Party.

The big question, as it is often put, is whether politicians should follow their “principles” given that those principles risk making them “unelectable”. If unelectable, then the policies in question will never be put into practice, it is argued, and hence to a large extent any ensuing debate is pointless.

Regardless, these are interesting times when it comes to political events, and given that so much of politics is policies, and so many policies are economic in nature, there’s never been a better time to be studying economics!

The UK-EU Deal

Today we have found out what all the renegotiation was about: the possibility that the UK might be able to put a stop temporarily to in-work benefits being paid to EU nationals working in the UK (assuming other EU countries are happy with this happening in any particular situation).

If that sounds a little underwhelming, it is probably because it is, which must be both good and bad.

Good, since there is no dramatic altering of the right of free movement of labour within the EU, as was hoped by some in the Conservative Party. As we’ve just covered in unemployment in our lectures, labour mobility is a good thing. Yes, it does lead to more uncertainty for us since there’s a larger pool of labour potentially for any job we do, but equally it gives both us, and firms, great opportunities to move into new jobs that are better suited to us, and better suited to firms. Workers aren’t restricted simply on the basis of a passport within the EU from taking their ideal job, and equally, firms aren’t stopped from recruiting the ideal worker for the post they’ve advertised because the ideal worker doesn’t have the right (European) passport.

Bad, since those hoping for big reforms in order to vote to remain may well be unhappy with this rather weak deal. Those seeking the UK’s exit claim that the UK gets little back from the EU, and simply gets told what to do. Rules and regulations we just have to accept are made in Brussels, not Westminster. This outcome, which reflects on Cameron’s inability to get what members in his party would ideally have hoped for (ability to stop inward migration unilaterally, plus other grabs back of national sovereignty). As I’ve written before on this blog, and mentioned in lecture, such issues regarding sovereignty clash with the reality of a common market – we can’t be involved in a common market without a common regulatory structure determined by some central regulatory body.

On balance, will it leave the UK any closer to the exit door? This is obviously impossible to say; even opinion polls can only give so much insight.

Will it even matter? Clara Sanderlind makes the point here that since most EU migrants working in the UK don’t claim in-work (or out of work) benefits, the deal will make no difference whatsoever to actual flows of migrants.

This week in lectures we’re covering trade and globalisation, topics which have so many obvious applications into the current UK relationship with the EU. See you later in the week!

Optimism, anxiety and the state of the economy

Yesterday US President Obama gave an annual speech that US Presidents give, called the State of the Union address. Conservative thinkers here think that David Cameron should initiate a similar thing, but that’s by the by. The BBC reports that Obama’s final SOTU (everything it seems gets an acronym in the US) conveyed a message regarding optimism and anxiety.

You may think trivial emotions like optimism and anxiety are utterly irrelevant when it comes to how economic outcomes are determined, but you’d probably be wrong. Indeed, one of the early Keynesian business cycle theories that we’ll cover later in term suggests that co-ordination failures occur because some people are less optimistic and hence don’t do particular things (e.g. produce less thinking they won’t sell all that much), leading others to do the same – the pessimism of some is contagious.

The antidote to such failures of co-ordination might be more co-ordinated positive speak – such as Obama encouraging everyone to be optimistic. It sounds almost silly, but what is the empirical evidence? Here’s some bedtime reading on the matter, work by an economist called Sylvain Leduc who considers business confidence and economic fluctuations. Work I’ve been doing myself suggests that the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, which determines monetary policy (the setting of interest rates to achieve an inflation target), pays a lot of attention to business confidence when considering the state of the economy.

Macroeconomic Uncertainty

Today’s BBC headline is the Chancellor warning about a “‘dangerous cocktail’ of economic risks” facing the UK economy in 2016, suggesting this year will be the toughest since the financial crisis. It’s more politics than economics as one reads what the Chancellor actually said in a BBC Radio 4 interview this morning, representing expectations management: after all the positive talk about the economy by the Conservatives before the election and since, things have changed somewhat in recent months to challenge that outlook.

One of those things was that GDP growth for 2015Q3 was revised down – not by a huge amount, from 0.5% to 0.4% – but a downward revision nonetheless, and along with other downward revisions has meant that the UK grew significantly less in 2015 than was previously thought.

Another is the continued low oil price which, while great at the petrol pump for the paying customer, has mixed impacts on the UK economy which does export oil.

Perhaps most interest, however, is to also consider the Independent’s take on the Chancellor’s recent actions (as well as rhetoric): it talks about the role that economic forecasts played in the Chancellor’s budget giveaway in the Autumn Statement in November, noting that they might have been “potentially unreliable”. We noted here at the time that the budget giveaway did rely heavily on forecasts for GDP growth: governments need forecasts of economic growth in order to project the tax receipts they will get, and the amounts of benefits they’ll have to pay out, which heavily influences the level of the budget deficit/surplus. If growth now comes in lower than was forecast, this will almost certainly mean that the budget deficit will be worse than expected, casting doubt on the ability of the UK economy to meet the Chancellor’s new Fiscal Charter: to balance the budget in normal economic times.

As well as lecturing Introductory Macroeconomics this term and hence covering issues mentioned here in greater depth, I’ll also be lecturing a third year course on forecasting, where we will discuss the kinds of methods that are used to produce the kinds of forecasts that underly government budget decisions like these. Many of our undergraduate students take placements and graduate roles with the Government Economic Service, which could see them being placed in the Treasury, hence right in the centre of the process of generating those forecasts. What you are doing here as a student could play a crucial role in shaping the future of our country!

Science, Innovation and the EU

Image from www.rand.org

As you are all hopefully well aware, there’ll be a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union either this year or the next.

Both sides of the debate are throwing around numbers, not least about science. This means it’s more important than ever to understand the economics surrounding such a huge decision for the UK economy, because often those most involved in political campaigns tend to be more casual with their facts, and their reasoning.

The impetus for this post is this Tweet from Douglas Carswell: “Innovation and science need Brexit”, with a link to his own blog article on the matter.

I tried to get Carswell to talk to last year’s EC114 group as part of a series of election-related talks, but unfortunately after accepting my invitation, he subsequently pulled out. I had thought from much of what I’d heard him say, that he was more reasonable and reasoned than most in his new party, Ukip. However, his blog causes me to question that analysis; if you follow the link to this article, the title is “Small business is not for staying”, and is based on one opinion poll in which, remarkably, 40% of small businesses think we should leave (higher than usually found in polls), but 47% think we should stay. That is, small businesses are 47 to 40 in favour of staying, yet the title of the article says small business are “not for staying”.

Regardless, let’s think a little more about science and innovation and how they would function inside and outside of the EU. What would the differences be? Currently, small businesses can export into a common market covering 500m+ customers without tariffs or (much) hindrance. They can employ whoever they wish from a labour market of 300m+ keen workers without (much) hindrance. Universities, and private sector research labs can do the same – they can discuss their research more easily with researchers at hundreds of universities across the continent as opposed to just our own universities here in the UK, and universities can employ productive staff from all over the continent rather than being confined to just applicants with particular passports.

If it happened to be that the most productive people in Europe, and the most innovative, were all located in the UK, and this was likely to always be the case, then clearly there would be no loss from Brexit. Brexit would increase the barriers to employing staff from all over Europe (indeed, the main cause of increased bureaucratic burden on our universities is not the EU, but is increased British government regulations on employing staff and recruiting students from outside our borders) – what reason is there to believe this would not be the case? Brexit would make it harder for universities to collaborate with other universities around Europe since much funding is based on cross-border collaborations, and there is no reason to believe this funding would be unaffected by Brexit.

Small businesses would face impediments to trading with our closest geographic neighbours, and the ones in which they likely already have close links due to that geographic proximity – again, why should we believe otherwise? Even if, after various trade negotiations to set up free trade agreements were concluded miraculously quickly, it is hard to imagine there would not be other impediments put in place that would restrict such trade both here and in Europe (exhortations to “trade locally” to “keep the money in our economy”, for example). Small businesses would also face yet more restrictions on who they can employ. Rather than the most suited worker, it would be the most suited worker provided they had a British passport (or were willing to go through the increasingly highly costly, lengthy and discriminatory process of getting a visa). It might be that this would not affect hiring patterns, but this seems highly unlikely.

The retort to this entire analysis would be it’s one sided in that it’s not including the effect of red tape. It’s argued that the EU imposes a huge amount of restrictions which stifle innovation and creativity. This blog post isn’t the place to expand this particularly much, other than to say that regulations, by their nature, regulate activity and hence based on some analysis will restrict particular economic activity deemed to be socially undesirable. There’s little doubt some regulations will thus make some producers (and free market believers) less happy than others, but the important question really is: would UK regulation be any different to EU regulation? As mentioned above, UK regulation is getting tighter and tighter for employment and student recruitment, both of which must stifle innovation and creativity – would the UK actually be any better?

Wouldn’t these effects all be very short term? Indeed, but what about the longer term effect? If in the longer term small businesses were somehow still able to trade without impediments to a market of 500m+ customers, and recruit without restriction from a labour market of 300m+ people, then clearly they would not be negatively affected, longer term. It’s very unclear though how this would be the case if Britain exits the EU. Equally, universities may flourish outside the EU, but it would need restrictions on their activity, and funding arrangements to be such that big international collaborations can still take place and thrive – the kinds of absence of restriction, and funding opportunities that currently exist in the EU.

Indeed, to increase productivity further, it would be better still if that labour market was larger, if those funding opportunities were wider to include the most innovative people from around the world – the EU is only so large, and must exclude a great many productive and innovative people. But it’s very hard to see how exiting the EU can bring about a UK system that is less restrictive in terms of international movements of people, capital, and ideas.

Finally, hasn’t my analysis been a little business/university focussed, at the expense of workers themselves? Indeed, workers are not just factors of production, are not just units in an analysis, but instead human beings whose productivity and innovativeness depends on a huge range of complex factors. We are risk averse people who instinctively dislike uncertainty. We like to think about our identity, and how that fits in with a particular group of similar people (fellow nations, often). All this is true, and forms the basis for anti-EU sentiment – we want to be protected from immigrants taking our jobs, and threatening our “way of life”. However, it’s a very narrow way of thinking about it. Anyone who has travelled, or been exposed to people from different cultures around the world, will have realised that this does not diminish their own identity – if anything, it makes it clearer and more distinct. It also fosters the ability to think more critically about aspects of one’s own identity and culture that perhaps need challenging. It’s a hugely positive and enriching experience, leading to much more developed people much more ready to operate both within our national environment, but internationally, too.

Would exiting the EU really ensure we keep experiencing the best from around the world, as we are currently able to? How would we ensure that keeps happening?