Further Reflections on the Autumn Statement

Here’s an blog post at a blog I regularly read: “So what has happened to the long-term plan, George?” It’s another set of reflections on last week’s Autumn Statement, adding in the current fiasco surrounding the Labour Party.
The Chancellor put off cutting the deficit based on a better than expected forecast of government revenues at last week’s Autumn Statement.
That decision probably won’t have great consequences – although it does raise questions of consistency, since as the blog article points out, the Prime Minister and Chancellor have long made the point that Labour didn’t “fix the roof while the sun was shining” back before the financial crisis.
The point it makes though is that weak oppositions, as Labour is currently providing to the Conservatives, allow potentially lazy, or complacent decisions to be made, which could have economic consequences.
I’d highly recommend the Political Betting blog that this article was motivated by; it’s a very interesting take on politics from the perspective of people who regularly place bets on political outcomes. The placing of bets is an economic decision, and many argue it’s an effective way of forcing rigorous thinking: if one’s money is at stake, one will be more conscious of potential biases that would result in betting losses.

Fiscal Plans and Fiscal Outcomes: The Importance of Forecasting

Next term we’ll learn about the difference between fiscal plans, and fiscal outturns, or outcomes. Fiscal plans are the ones set out today by the Chancellor in his Autumn Statement. Fiscal outturns are what we’ll see over the next four years.

Probably the most spectacular differences between plans and outcomes come when recessions come unexpectedly, like with the 2008 financial crisis which put paid to Gordon Brown’s Golden Rule (not borrowing for current consumption over the “cycle”). The outcomes, as we all know, were very large deficits, up to 10% of GDP.

What is perhaps most striking is that for all the anticipation of where the cuts would fall, instead the news is all about what cuts didn’t happen: tax credit cuts cancelled, police, international development, healthcare and defence budgets all protected, with a list of additional goodies thrown in.

How was all this possible? Without resorting to cynicism about politicians dressing up the good news and hiding the bad news (hint: local government and various tax rises hidden in the small print), this Guardian analysis makes it clear what changed: an upward adjustment in forecasts for growth and hence tax receipts.

The idea is this: as the independent Office for Budget Responsibility provided a very positive forecast for growth and hence tax receipts (we pay more tax when we earn more and spend more), this meant that in order to keep to his fiscal plans to eliminate the deficit, Osborne had to do much less – growth would do the hard work for him.

But the main point is this: all of this is based on economic forecasts, rather than actual events – it’s plans, not outcomes. We have to wait until 2020 to see what the outcomes are like. It shows just how hugely important economic forecasts are, however – and why you should think about taking my forecasting module when you get to your third year 🙂

What is this “Fiscal Charter”?

The main news this morning is overtly political: Labour have apparently performed a U-turn and now oppose the Fiscal Charter than the Chancellor, George Osborne, has proposed. While the U-turn is obviously a political story, and Labour is a political party with plenty of problems at the moment, the Fiscal Charter is something that very much invokes economics, and economic analysis.

What is this Fiscal Charter? Here’s what George Osborne said in his Summer Budget Speech back on July 8 2015:

Today I publish the new Fiscal Charter that commits our country to that path of budget responsibility.

While we move from deficit to surplus, this Charter commits us to keeping debt falling as a share of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] each and every year– and to achieving that budget surplus by 2019-20.

Thereafter, governments will be required to maintain that surplus in normal times – in other words, when there isn’t a recession or a marked slowdown.

Only when the OBR [Office for Budget Responsibility] judge that we have real GDP growth of less than 1% a year, as measured on a rolling four-quarter basis, will that surplus no longer be required.

So in “normal” economic times, governments must run a budget surplus – something that will be enshrined in law should it be passed through parliament this Autumn.

The budget surplus is the difference between government receipts and government spending: T-G, in econ-maths-speak. It is different from government debt, which can crudely be thought of as the cumulation of previous budget deficits – when (T-G)<0.

It seems eminently sensible that when the economy is growing, governments should not be running deficits: in the good times, governments do not need to stimulate economic activity via tax cuts and extra spending projects, and indeed they collect more in various taxes: income tax, corporation tax, VAT, and so on.

However, this next graph suggests that UK governments for centuries have not been very good at this:

gov-surplus-1700

Going back to 1700, looking at 315 years of data, in only 83 of those has the UK government run a surplus; less than a third of the time. A casual glance also shows that the positive/negative split bears no resemblance to which party, left or right, has been in power; for almost all of the 1960s and 1970s, when both major parties had spells in power, the government almost exclusively ran deficits.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that Osborne’s charter is a bad thing: if it forces governments to run surpluses, this must be a good thing for the national debt? There’s loads to say about this, and we’ll say a lot more come the Spring in EC114, but for now it’s worth pointing out that the national debt (the cumulated overspends of UK governments) is not only reduced by running a surplus; despite the UK running deficits for much of the post-WW2 period, the following graph shows that UK national debt fell from 238% of GDP in 1948 to 42% by 1980:

ukgs_line

 

So a budget surplus is not essential for reducing the national debt burden. Indeed, many argue it may even hinder this; after all, the UK economy has performed well over the last 315 years despite predominantly having a government operating a deficit. In part, this is because governments invest in public infrastructure projects that can facilitate growth: transport and telecommunications networks, for example.

And this is where Labour appears to be in a muddle about the Fiscal Charter. The Fiscal Charter as Osborne outlined makes no room even for investing in public projects, focussing only on the budget as a whole. Often we split the budget into that for current consumption and that for investment: the part for current consumption (things we spend now: benefits mainly) is referred to often as the structural balance. Labour wants to still be able to spend on infrastructure projects in the good times, whereas Osborne’s Fiscal Charter rules even that out.

More in the Spring 🙂