Deprivation accounts of the wrong of killing hold that what makes it wrong to kill an individual, is that you deprive them of all the distinctive goods of human life, both present and future. This theory has a lot to be said for it (though I do not argue for it here). But despite its appeal, it is often rejected on the ground that it implies that the seriousness of the wrong killing depends on the value of the life the victim is deprived of. So ceteris paribus, it implies that it is a greater wrong to kill a 20 year old than a 50 year old. This has two implausible implications: it means that it fails to respect the moral equality of persons. Second it implies that the worst killing would (ceteris paribus) be a very early abortion. These are two aspects of what I call the variable wrongness objection to deprivation accounts.
I consider and reject a number of ways in which this objection may be dealt with, and argue that these are inadequate. I then offer an alternative defence.