Brad Hooker on Derek Parfit’s Philosophical Legacy

By Aart van Gils and Joshua Wells

The first session of REAPP, 19th January 2017, in this term was convened under unpleasant circumstances, those being the death of Derek Parfit, who died on the 2nd of January 2017. Derek Parfit requires no introduction to those who are familiar with moral philosophy or those who read this blog (‘Equality and Priority’ was read last term). Our session was led by Professor Brad Hooker, who outlined the development of Parfit’s moral philosophy.

Parfit studied history as an undergraduate at Balliol College Oxford, then he won a Harkness fellowship to study and Harvard and Columbia. Upon returning from the USA his interests had shifted from history to philosophy. Soon after his return to Oxford, he won a fellowship to All Souls College (he follows the footsteps of other philosophical greats by receiving this fellowship such as Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Bernard Williams).

Parfit’s first book, Reasons and Persons, was published in 1984. At this stage, Parfit had already spent over 10 years at All Souls. It has hard to understate the impact of this book. Suffice to say, if you wanted to be taken seriously in moral philosophy, it seems like you had to be familiar with Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. This first book by Parfit spans over 500 pages and is made up of four parts. Brad very helpfully outlined the history of the book, meaning how it is a product of Parfit’s previous publications. The list of the relevant publications before Reasons and Persons is as follows:

1971. ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80 (January): 3–27

1972. ‘On the Importance of Self-Identity’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (October): 683–90.

1973. ‘Later Selves and Moral Principles’, in Alan Montefiore (ed.) Philosophy and Personal Relations, Routledge.

1979a. ‘Is Commonsense Morality Self-Defeating?’ Journal of Philosophy 76 (10): 533–45.

1979b. ‘Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma’, Proceedings of the British Academy.

1982a. ‘Future Generations: Further Problems’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2): 113–72.

1982b. ‘Personal Identity and Rationality’, Synthese 53 (2): 227–41.

1983. ‘Rationality and Time’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84: 47–82.

Focusing on the four different parts within Reasons and Persons, and relating these parts to the list of relevant publications above, Brad gave us the insightful analysis of this monumental work in moral philosophy:

1984. Reasons and Persons, OUP.

Part One: ‘Self-Defeating Theories’ (Self-interest Theory is not really self-defeating; Common-sense Morality is self-defeating because of its agent-relativity.) See 1979a, 1979b.

Part Two: ‘Rationality and Time’ (Self-interest Theory of Rational/Good Reasons for Action is time-neutral but agent-relative, which makes it vulnerable to attack from the time-relative and agent-relative Present-aim Theory and the time-neutral and agent-neutral act-consequentialism.) See 1982b and 1983.

Part Three: ‘Personal Identity’ (Strict identity is all-or-nothing and transitive. What matters is psychological continuity and connectedness, which of course is not all-or-nothing. The metaphysical truth about personal identity impugns Self-interest Theory and extreme retributivism.) See 1971, 1972, 1973.

Part Four: ‘Future Generations’ (Repugnant conclusion: There are compelling arguments for adding people and then redistributing so as to make people equally well off. But repeating this indefinitely leads to a massively larger population of people each of whom has a life barely worth living. That is a repugnant conclusion. But where does the argument for that repugnant conclusion go wrong?) See 1982a.

Each section of this book has attracted considerable interest from the philosophical community. Producing the book undoubtedly had its impact on Parfit who afterwards was told to rest by his doctor. It appears that despite his greatness Parfit like so many academics felt the burden of publishing – a reassuring thought for philosophy students who will find themselves struggling at any stage: even Parfit was only human. Crucially, Reasons and Persons was enough for Parfit to become a permanent member of All Souls College. Brad thinks that this move from a prized to permanent fellow is something which no one else has ever done(!)

And for a long time that looked like it might be it for Parfit on the book front. The following articles might be considered those that marked Parfit’s transitional period from Reasons and Persons to his next, again incredibly influential manuscript, On What Matters:

1991a. ‘Equality or Priority’, The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas. See 1997b.

1991b. ‘Why Does the Universe Exist?’ Harvard Review of Philosophy 1 (1): 4-5.

1992. ‘The Puzzle of Reality: Why Does the Universe Exist?’ in Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 418–27.

1997a. ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 71 (1): 99–130

1997b. ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10 (3): 202–21.

2002. ‘What We Can Rationally Will’, Tanner Lectures on Human Values.

2003. ‘Justifiability to Each Person’, Ratio 16: 368–90.

2004. ‘Kant’s Arguments for His Formula of Universal Law’, in Christine Sypnowich (ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen. OUP.

However, Parfit was a perfectionist par exemple and it seemed that he would never be happy enough with the draft of On What Matters to publish it. In 2011 though, he was happy enough with some of On What Matters and published the first two volumes – the third has been made available very recently! The style of On What Matters has been almost as influential as its content. Brad gave us the following breakdown of what he – like Parfit himself – considers to be Parfit’s greatest work:

On What Matters, vols. I and II

The first volume starts with 1997a, then 2002, 2006, 2003, 1991b, 1992.

Parfit carefully considers the strengths and defects of many different possible formulations of the categorical imperative, some of which definitely count as revised formulations of Kant’s imperative. Parfit’s analysis reveals that the best (albeit revised) formulation is that everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will.

This formula holds that the correctness of proposed moral rules turns on what everyone could rationally will. According to Parfit, if we have true beliefs, what we can rationally will depends what good reasons there are for willing this or willing that. And he contends that the good reasons we can have for willing universal acceptance of one set of rules rather than another come either from facts about what the consequences would be for others or from facts about what the consequences would be for ourselves.

Parfit develops a highly impressive, though contentious, “value-based” theory of good reasons for desiring and willing. He then argues that everyone does have sufficient reason to will (and thus can rationally will) that everyone accept rules whose universal acceptance would produce the best consequences impartially considered. And he argues that there is there is no other set of rules that everyone has sufficient reason to will that everyone accept.

The second moral theory to which Parfit gives extended attention is Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism. According to Parfit, the best version of this theory is that everyone ought to follow the rules that no one could reasonably reject. There are issues about how to interpret this theory. But, on what is arguably the best interpretation of Scanlon’s contractualism, the rules that no one could reasonably reject do coincide with the rules whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. Hence, the best version of Scanlon’s contractualist ethics and the best version of Kantian ethics may converge on the same rules and thus coincide in their implications.

Parfit goes on to argue that both Kantian ethics and contractualism lead to rule-consequentialism, according to which an act is wrong if forbidden by the rules whose universal acceptance would have the best consequences, impartially considered. Parfit argues that the rules whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will, which are also the rules that no one could reasonably reject, are in fact the rules whose universal acceptance would make things have the best consequences impartially considered. Rule-consequentialism is thus argued to be the upshot of the best forms of Kantian and contractualist ethics.

The first part of vol. II of On What Matters is taken up by papers by 4 critics of vol. I: Susan Wolf, Allan Wood, Barbara Herman, Tim Scanlon. Parfit then replies and adds further material.

After the vol. II of On What Matters, Parfit produced two more noteworthy publications to the study of moral philosophy.

2012. ‘Another Defence of the Priority View’, Utilitas 24 (03): 399–440.

2013. Vol. III of On What Matters. Shipped today. Also replies to critics, this time mostly about very metaethical topics.

Parfit’s absence from the philosophy community is a great loss to those who care about philosophy. His passion for philosophy can be seen this by the following anecdote. In the 1980’s, Parfit, G.A Cohen, Amartya Sen, and Ronald Dworkin took part in a reading group, which was mostly them disagreeing with each other – Brad mentioned that Oxford philosophy students referred to these sessions as ‘Star Wars’, for obvious reasons. It is said that in this room of greats, Parfit stood out due to not having any ego in the debate, he was only interested in following the logic and testing the strength of the arguments discussed. This is what philosophy has lost, a great and innovative mind, for whom all that mattered was the truth.

We would like to end this blog by saying thank you to Brad for an incredibly insightful talk about one of most interesting philosophers of the past century who will matter to the discipline for (at least) decades to come.

Derek Parfit (1997) – Equality and Priority

By Alex McLaughlin

This week’s REAPP session (10th Nov) offered the chance to discuss Derek Parfit’s classic paper, ‘Equality and Priority’. A special thanks is owed to Jamie Draper for introducing the paper and leading the discussion, but thanks also to everyone else who attended and who helped make the meeting such an interesting one.

Parfit’s paper is famous for introducing two different egalitarian positions. A ‘telic’ egalitarian is someone who thinks that inequality is intrinsically bad, whereas a ‘deontic’ egalitarian is only committed to objecting to an inequality where its presence can be traced to some form of wrongdoing. Though we could occupy many different positions about what counts as wrongdoing, the key point is that in order to condemn an inequality, the deontic egalitarian is in need of some further facts about its origin. This is not the case for the telic egalitarian, who sees the inequality as objectionable tout court. Despite the telic version’s possession, at least in Parfit’s view, of significant initial appeal, it is vulnerable to a ‘levelling down’ objection which might prompt us to abandon it entirely. Part of Pafit’s aim in the article is to suggest that there is a third view – the ‘priority’ view, which I will introduce below – that might offer sanctuary to our egalitarian intuitions and which is not threatened by this powerful objection.

Perhaps predictably, this ‘levelling down objection’ took up a large portion of the discussion. The core of the challenge is as follows. If equality is intrinsically good then there must be something positive about removing an inequality even in a case where this is achieved through bringing everyone down to the level of the worst off. In such a situation, some would be being made worse off and nobody better off, and yet the telic egalitarian is committed to saying that this state of affairs is in at least one way better. This might seem like an untenable conclusion. To draw out the force of the objection, Parfit imagines a case where a natural disaster destroys the resources of the better off and knocks them down to the level of the worst off. Is there really something to be said for this eventuality? It seems that the telic egalitarian would have to say yes. Notice, though, they would only have to agree that there was ‘something good’ about it; egalitarians tend to be pluralists and could therefore deny that equality is the only thing that matters. In the natural disaster case there would be egalitarian reasons telling in its favour, but there may be many other reasons that tell against it all things considered.

Jamie helpfully introduced an example of intergenerational levelling down. If it is the case that future generations will be better off than us, and if we were to hold a telic view about intergenerational equality, then it looks like we have egalitarian reasons to defer burdens into the future. Could we, for example, justify climate change mitigation on egalitarian grounds if we were sure that future generations would be significantly better off than us? At first glance this might appear difficult – it might be that the effects of climate change would reduce the inequality between the present and future. This could be a serious problem for the egalitarian view, given the consensus in the room that we should definitely mitigate climate change. There were, however, some arguments offered in defence of egalitarianism on this point. A family of telic egalitarian views under the banner of ‘luck egalitarianism’ allow for departures from equality when they can be tracked in a relevant way to an agent’s voluntary choice. Perhaps an argument could be made along these lines that we should bear the burdens of climate change, even though it would not reduce intergenerational equality. In other words, could it be that the current generation’s responsibility for causing climate change provides us with an egalitarian reason against deferring any burdens? In any case, it remains open to the pluralist egalitarian to respond that there are many non-egalitarian reasons for mitigating climate change. Of course, there is a great deal more to be said on these points, but if nothing else the discussion revealed the complexity of these sorts of cases.

Interestingly, some in the room were unconvinced that Parfit’s alternative to the telic view would completely allay these sorts of worries. The priority view holds that ‘[b]enefiting people matters more the worse off these people are’ (p.213). For the most part egalitarians will be happy to endorse this view as giving benefits to the worse off will have the effect of reducing inequality. But the advantage of this view, as Parfit sees it, is that by virtue of its being concerned with absolute rather than relative benefits, it seems untroubled by the levelling down objection. Returning to the intergenerational climate change case, however, some were confused as to whether prioritarianism would tell against us deferring the costs of climate change. Again, assuming future generations are to be richer than the present (it should be noted that this is a rather controversial assumption!) do the poorest of the current generation have claims to that part of our current expenditure that will be to the benefit of the future? Unsurprisingly we were unable to get much further than diagnosing some of the vexing problems of intergenerational justice, but thanks again to Jamie for relating them to this great paper and thanks again to everyone who attended.

Philip Stratton-Lake’s (2016)- Intuition, Self-evidence and understanding

By Joshua Wells

 

In the third meeting of the REAPP reading group for this academic year, 27 October 2016, we discussed Philip Stratton-lake’s paper from the Oxford studies in metaethics, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, “Intuition, Self-evidence and understanding”. Luckily Philip is based in the Universities Philosophy department, and he was able to present the chapter himself. Philip started his presentation by explaining the context of this chapter from his own experience of philosophy. He explained that he use to have a strong interest in self-evidence, an interest which was much stronger than the one he had about intuitions. However, this has now changed and for him intuitions are of more interest than self-evidence. The reason for this became clear throughout his talk, and will be clear by the end of this blog.

 

The first point is that ethical intuitionists claim that ‘fundamental moral truths’ are self-evident. To test for the plausibility of this view, Philip uses Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. The advantage of Audi’s account, which makes it appealing to Philip that understanding does not compel belief, according to Audi. Despite this Audi’s account says that an adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition justifies belief. This statement is represented by the idea that understanding P justifies a belief in P.

 

The next concern is about the implications of this account of self-evidence for synthetic propositions. Synthetic propositions require evidence for their truth. And belief does not constitute evidence. Therefore understanding P is not evidence of P being true which means we face the situation of where my understanding cannot justify belief in a self-evident proposition his raises the question as to what can justify a belief in a self-evident proposition? The paper suggests that intuitions can do the work – but only when understood correctly.

 

The paper continues to explore what Audi has to offer in this case, by looking at how he understands intuitions. For Audi, intuitions are types of belief. This means that Audi’s account of intuitions is not appropriate for the paper, because belief of P is not evidence for P being true. Yet this is not the full extent the concern with Audi’s account of intuitions. Audi’s account cannot accommodate the recalcitrance nature of intuitions. The discussion focused on the type of intuitions we have when it comes to maths. For example we know that 0.999 reoccurring equals 1. Yet we have the intuition that they are different. It seems that any acceptable account of intuitions must be able to cope with recalcitrance of intuitions.

 

The best account of intuitions, according to the paper is provided by George Bealer. The reason for this is that his account is able to offer an explanation of recalcitrance, and where intuitions are what the paper calls ‘intellectual seemings’ not beliefs. Intellectual seemings are mental state which are not based on judgments, guesses or hunches. Importantly they have the phenomenology of perceptual seemings. That means that certain things can appear to be intellectually true. In the same way that a table appears to be rectangular.

 

To conclude, this means that intuitions as intellectual seemings can justify beliefs, but they cannot justify themselves. Intuitions can only be explained, but not justified. This means that self-evidence has no epistemic role in intuitionist epistemology. Because all the work is done by intuitions. The paper is clearly significant, for it seems to take Audi’s account of self-evidence and show how self-evidence is not able to do the work that ethical intuitions require it to should be looking to intuitions, not self-evidence. The discussion was very stimulating, with questions ranging from infinity to inference.

 

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2016) – Affirmative Action, Historical Injustice, and the Concept of Beneficiaries

By Joshua Wells 

In this session, 19 May 2016, we had the pleasure of discussing a very recent paper by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen published in 2016. The paper was selected by Alex McLaughlin, who introduced the paper. Alex started by summarising the paper.  He explained that the paper is motivated by engaging with the argument that innocent beneficiaries of past injustice have a duty to benefit those who are not voluntary victims of this past injustice. This argument will be referred to as the Beneficiaries Pays Principle. The argument of Lippert-Rasmussen is that those who are convinced by the Beneficiary Pays principle are actually being convinced by luck egalitarian intuitions, moreover if you pick out cases where luck egalitarianism diverges from the Beneficiary Pays Principle, then the luck egalitarianism conclusions seem to be much more comfortable for our intuitions to accept.

Early in the article Lippert-Rasmussen engages with some arguments made by Daniel Butt. He argues that Butt has presented cases where the luck egalitarianism and Beneficiary Pays Principle move in the same direction. The starting point is his engagement with Butt’s intuitive argument:

‘Butt’s most discussed argument—call it the intuitive argument—rests on a desert-island example involving four farmers. A is hardworking and produces 700 units of resources, which suffices for comfortable living. B and C are laid back but just, and put in enough working hours so that they can each produce 200 units provided D does not intervene. Unfortunately, D is laid back and unjust. D unjustly tries to divert the water from B‘s and C‘s plots of land onto his own. D, however, is incompetent and ends up diverting water away from C‘s and his own land and onto B‘s. Consequently, B produces 400 units and C and D produce nothing.15 In despair, D hangs himself. C is now starving and someone should help him. A has more resources than B and can better afford doing so than B. However, Butt thinks it is counterintuitive to let the remedial duties fall on A on account of his greater capacity to help. Instead, he canvasses the following principle (henceforth the beneficiary principle):

The Beneficiary Principle is then formulated as follows:

If B benefits—however involuntarily—from an injustice being committed against C, then B has a compensatory obligation to C to pay C compensation up to the point where [B is] no longer [beneficiary] of the injustice in question’.

Lippert-Rasmussen complaint is that we can accept the conclusion of the Desert Case on luck-egalitarian grounds and that, therefore, this case fails to support the Beneficiary Principle. Instead we must look at cases where the luck-egalitarian gives a different answer to the proponent of the Beneficiary Principle. However prior to exploring different cases to test this, Rasmussen looks at Butt’s conceptual argument. The conceptual argument is that we cannot say something is unjust but are unwilling to rectify the injustice because we benefit from it.

Lippert-Rasmussen provides four response to Butt’s conceptual argument. Most of the conversation centred on Lippert- Rasmussen’s attack. The main point made was that Lippert-Rasmussen’s attack does not seem to focus on the core of the conceptual argument, but rather the edges of it. As a result, even if we accept the force of these points, Butt may be able to adjust his theory while keeping the main claim intact. An example is that Butt links duties to suffering. Lippert-Rasmussen objects to this saying that injustice need not involve suffering. Of course he is correct, however this does not undermine Butt’s case, Butt could easily adjust the creation of duties to a domain which is greater than suffering.

Most of the hour was spent exploring these four responses to Butt’s conceptual argument, therefore it would be unfair to judge the whole the paper based upon our decision. Yet it seems clear that Lippert-Rasmussen has not persuaded the group with his critique of Butt conceptual argument. Despite this the group did seem sympathetic to the idea of the paper, that being the concern with the intuitive argument of Butt’s, and disagreement seemed to mostly about how Lippert-Rasmussen reached the conclusion as oppose to the conclusions themselves.

Elizabeth Harman (2016) – Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes

By Aart van Gils

Today, we discussed Elizabeth Harman’s (2016) “Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes”. Euan had proposed this paper to us, and he was so kind to present the key points of the paper and lead the subsequent discussion. There were several interesting points made in the discussion, but for the sake of clarity and brevity only the most significant will be mentioned.

The first thing we noted from Harman’s rather dense paper was that it is not entirely clear what the background assumptions are for trying to argue for this new category of “morally permissible moral mistakes”. Fortunately, Euan’s expertise came to our rescue here. Put briefly, this new category is of particular interest to advocates of the view that ‘ought’ can be explained in terms of reasons. This is because one of the fundamental problems advocates of that view face is that they seem unable to account for supererogatory actions. To show this, we can consider a general form of one of the many examples Harman uses.

Suppose that you promised your friend to pick him up from the airport, because he is a nervous flyer and seeing a familiar, friendly face would do him a lot of good. Unfortunately, on your way to the airport your car breaks down and you can either pay a very expensive bill to have it ‘instantly’ repaired, or decide to have it repaired later, which will save you some money but will also make it the case that you will not be able to pick up your friend from the airport and so you fail to keep your promise. Harman wants to say that failing to pick up your friend is a “morally permissible moral mistake”.

The explanation for this is that the original moral requirement that stems from your promise to pick up your friend is nullified by the unexpected great burden that you now face – the hefty repairs bill – if you keep your promise to pick him up. Nevertheless, the keeping of the promise remains present as a moral reason upon which you can act. Therefore, we have a balance of reasons between at least the moral reason to still pick up your friend and the conflicting prudential reason to not pay the extra expenses of having your car repaired on the spot.

Harman then relies on the separation of the idea of moral requirement from the all-things-considered ought. She would argue that the overall balance of reasons in this scenario, falls on the side of the moral reason to still pick up your friend. This means that all things considered, you ought to pick up your friend. However, given that there is no moral requirement involved, this means that we can still characterize this act as supererogatory. Crucially, failing to act upon this moral reason or choosing a different action than the one that the overall balance of reasons points to, is a morally permissible moral mistake. The result would be that those who advocate the view that ‘ought’ can be defined in terms of reasons, are in fact able to account for the supererogatory.

Criticisms were raised, however, that Harman heavily relies on rather technical understandings of ‘mistake’ and ‘moral mistake’, which seem to depart quite a bit from the common-sense understanding of when someone makes a ‘mistake’. Furthermore, with respect to the example mentioned here, she argues that when the agent decides to still pick their friend up by saying to themselves ‘I should do it!’ that the agent is “right”. But to say that the agent is “right” seems to suggest that we are no longer speaking about a supererogatory (i.e. merely permissible) act, but rather something that she is required to do.

A final interesting point that Harman makes, and which was unanimously accepted is that those who accept the possibility of performing supererogatory actions, are also committed to the possibility of suberogatory actions – actions which are bad but not wrong to do.

All in all, Harman’s “Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes” was a rich and interesting read which prompted both questions about metaethical categories, as well as the plausibility of a hotly-debated view on reasons and oughts. We thank everyone who was there for contributing to a very fruitful discussion, and we thank Euan in particular for bringing this interesting article to our attention.

Robert E. Goodin (1989) – Theories of Compensation

By Aart van Gils

Today, we discussed Robert E. Goodin’s (1989) “Theories of Compensation”. The paper was chosen by Josh, who was so kind to introduce the paper and its key points to us. There were several interesting points made in the discussion, but for the sake of clarity and brevity only the most significant will be mentioned.

First, Goodin distinguishes between two types of compensation, namely “means-replacing-compensation” (compensation1) and “ends-displacing-compensation” (compensation2), and he argues for the superiority of compensation1 over compensation2. Some worries were raised regarding this supposed superiority of compensation1. To name one in particular, there was the worry that the value of certain ends seems to derive in great part from the particular means that someone may use in order to achieve his or her end. Therefore, solely compensating people such that they would be able to achieve the same end, without considering whether the particular compensatory means provided were similar enough to the original means, seemed problematic.

In Goodin’s defence, however, it was pointed out that this objection relied on blurring the distinction between means and ends, and that if certain means were considered as necessary and/or invaluable, it seemed hard not to slot them under the heading of ‘ends’, which would require compensation. But Goodin could accept this point by broadening compensation2 and claim that this is how we compensate for the necessary and/or invaluable aims.

Second, Goodin seemed to waver between two different understandings of a Pareto improvement in an interpersonal distribution. Put simply, it was unclear whether Goodin’s view strictly required that people were in fact compensated for their losses or whether ‘virtual’ compensation (i.e. that the total gains would theoretically outweigh the total losses) would be sufficient.

It was acknowledged that Goodin’s view could be improved by a stricter definition of Pareto improvement. However, it was eventually agreed that this point was not part of the main argument and so, if necessary, Goodin could easily concede this point all the way, if pressed on it.

Third and final, there was disagreement regarding the strength of Goodin’s conclusion. The conclusion seemed to be that even if individuals were to have legitimate complaints for not being (sufficiently/appropriately) compensated, then it might be that the policy could nevertheless be adopted. The worry here was that a second level of compensation was introduced, meaning that besides the question of how people might be compensated for their losses, there was the option that the impersonal gains of a particular policy could outweigh the losses done to several individuals.

There was unanimous agreement that Goodin had more work to do here and that his conclusion moved too quickly from one step to the other. But again, in his defence, it was pointed out that actually Goodin had made the correct move by arguing for the permissibility of public policies, even if these policies would have the effect that some people would suffer losses which could not be compensated. To set compensation as a requirement on public policy, disallowing it when compensation was impossible or insufficient, would lead to an implausibly restrictive and/or conservative attitude in political decision-making.

All in all, Goodin’s “Theories of Compensation” raised several interesting issues, ranging from the theoretical distinction between different types of compensation to the practical application to several concrete cases. We thank everyone who was there for contributing to a very fruitful discussion, and we thank Josh in particular for bringing this interesting article to our attention.