Regulating ‘Live Volcanoes’: Health and Safety in Public

 

Images from Inquiry into Disaster at Nypro (UK) Ltd, Flixborough on 1/6/1974 (Official Report),via National Archive TS 84/37/1

Images from Inquiry into Disaster at Nypro (UK) Ltd, Flixborough on 1/6/1974 (Official Report),via National Archive TS 84/37/1New Picture (1)

“He [a senior HSE figure] put his hand up and said, ‘no, no, no, stop my boy, stop…that’s worker safety. That’s a dead volcano’, he said. ‘The live volcano is public safety. That is what’s going to energise everyone’.” [R. Bibbings interview, para.19]

One of the most pronounced shifts to have taken place in the last fifty years of health and safety regulation has been a movement towards recognising workplace risks that affect the general public. It is probably fair to say that the earliest eras of health and safety provision did not look beyond the factory or workshop in terms of their scope; indeed, most of the Factories Acts were explicitly limited in terms of the types of workplaces and industries in which they applied. But health and safety today is something that is understood as encompassing all areas of human activity, from education, to recreation, to work, to the use of public space. For many people, this ‘creep’ of health and safety into all areas of life is one of the key reasons for questioning the legitimacy of the law, and negative media coverage of health and safety does place an emphasis on the social, rather than the workplace, aspect of the issue. So when, and how, did this shift occur?

A review of the historical material suggests that the ‘public’ element was relatively little discussed before the 1970s, even in the aftermath of major events like Aberfan (which were seen as ‘public safety’ rather than ‘health and safety’ issues). The turning points appear to be twofold. While the Offices, Shops, and Railway Premises Act 1963 had broadened the scope of the workplaces in which health and safety risks were recognised, it was the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act s.3 which turned attention to ‘public’ safety risks. This had been introduced in part because of the Flixborough explosion in 1974, which showed the potential of high-hazard risks to ‘cross the factory fence’ and affect local communities. Even then, however, the potential of this extension of coverage was not really appreciated or recognised – policy observers from the time have confirmed that, in the words of a former civil servant (and HSE Director-General):

“Robens did envisage that there would be some limited duties towards the public. But…at the time when the Act was going through, I don’t think that the very extensive ways in which public health and safety have come into play was envisaged.” [J. Bacon interview, para.23]

The second turning point was the mid-1980s, when three factors coincided to make public opinion a key player in regulatory thinking. A combination of the politicisation of issues of regulation and government intervention (particularly by the EC) by the Thatcher governments, a series of major disasters affecting the public and workers between 1987-9 (including the Herald of Free Enterprise and Marchioness sinkings, Piper Alpha, Hillsborough, and the Clapham rail crash), and HSE’s efforts to account for growing concern over major hazard sites (mainly nuclear power, and especially post-Chernobyl) as part of their new Tolerability of Risk Framework (1988) meant that suddenly, what the man in the street thought mattered a great deal more than it had in the past. Not only was more evidence then gathered about public opinion, but the balancing approach to be adopted became more explicit. While the initial assessments of both tolerability and preference looked at high-hazard issues, the legislative and policy framework that was created was soon providing a basis for judgements about an ever-widening array of sectors and issues.

In this way, the new focus on principled, evidence-led decision-making, coupled with the ability of s.3 HSWA to apply to people outside the workplace, would change the face of health and safety regulation forever. It remains an irony that the movement towards applying the law to ‘crazy’ cases like so-called bans on playing conkers in schools, was driven in part by the need to respond to some of the most hazardous workplace dangers imaginable, and a desire for greater rationality.

Government Report on Risk Released

Last week, the UK Government Chief Scientific Advisor launched the first of his annual themed reports, entitled ‘Innovation: Managing Risk, Not Avoiding It’. It is significant that Sir Mark Walport has chosen to focus the report on risk, recognising the significance of the topic for contemporary British society.

 

Mike has contributed a short case study to the report, using an historical example – the introduction of driverless trains on the Docklands Light Railway in London in the 1980s – as a means of thinking about the ways in which risks and perceptions of risks have been managed in the past, and what this might suggest for the introduction of new technologies in the future.

 

Writing the case study presented Mike with some challenges. Usually historians have the luxury of several thousand words in which to develop an extended argument, going into the nuances and complexities in some detail. In this case, though, the word limit was significantly tighter – only 500 words. It meant focusing in on the absolute essentials, as well as identifying what might be of most benefit for the contemporary user – important, given the report will be read by government staff and policy-makers in Britain and beyond in order to shape their decisions and frame debates in the future.

 

Mike’s case study identified a number of factors that influenced perceptions of safety and risk in relation to the DLR’s driverless trains, including proactive communication, public testing and the role of state regulation. He has suggested that these areas might all usefully be considered when introducing new technologies that might be perceived as in some way risky – but also that far from a knee-jerk reaction that feared driverless technologies, the public’s risk perception was more sophisticated, including a more open-minded approach to new technologies.

 

You can find the report and the associated evidence and case studies here.