In Defence of Panmoralism

The thesis of panmoralism is easy to state: every reason is a moral reason. It goes against the widely held view that there is a distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. Section 2 clarifies and elaborates panmoralism. Weaker claims are distinguished and the application to motivating and normative reasons is explained. Section 3 argues that once reasons of permissibility are included in moral reasoning, many if not most of the reasons thought to be non-moral are seen to be moral after all. In section 4 I argue that prudential reasons are a species of moral reasons, and in section 5 that the same is true of reasons of taste and etiquette. The general form of the argument is seen to apply to all putatively non-moral reasons, once the directedness of morality to the human good is appreciated. In section 6 I argue that if there are explanatory reasons (alongside the motivating and the normative), they too – perhaps surprisingly – are moral reasons. Section 7 shows how reasons of supererogation, suberogation, and what I call subliceity are all kinds of moral reason. In section 8 I briefly observe how panmoralism reduces moral conflicts, and I conclude by speculation on the origin of what, for the panmoralist, is the mischievous distinction between moral and non-moral reasons.