In this paper I explore reasons for thinking that it is better if moral realism is false. These divide into two kinds of arguments. First, there are reasons for thinking that morality itself would be worse if realism were true. For example, some philosophers argue that realism grounds moral truths in things not worth caring about. Second, there are reasons for thinking that there is something morally pernicious about endorsing realism, that being a moral realist is immoral per se. For example, some philosophers argue that realism commits us to wrongly conditionalizing our first-order moral judgments on the existence of moral facts in the realist sense. I argue that both lines of argument fail. In some cases they rely on implausible grounding principles, and in others they overgeneralize to all metaethical projects. Finally, I go on the offense and argue that endorsing moral realism can be a morally good thing to do.